Abu Sayyaf: From pirate bandits to multinational enterprise to pirate bandits again.

A threat and organisational structure of terrorist group Abu Sayyaf through the years.

Background

Around 1991, a native of Southern Philippines named Abdurajak Janjalani founded the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) (Gerdes et al. 2014, p. 268). The name ‘Abu Sayyaf’ was used to honor Rasul Sayyaf, a prominent Afghan Mujahidin leader (Banlaoi 2006, p.248). Janjalani was allegedly part of Rasul Sayyaf’s camp during the efforts led by Afghan Mujahidins against Soviet occupation (B.Singh & J.Singh 2019, p. 402).

The ASG would become one of the most violent religiously motivated transnational groups in recent Southeast Asian history (Katagiri 2019, p. 519). The group was listed by the (U.S. Department of State [DOS] 1997) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in late 1997 and was a major target of a 14-year U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) in Mindanao (Southern Philippines) (Robinson et al. 2016, p.1). Mindanao is a historic site of Muslim struggle and resistance and serves as the base of local militant groups, eventually becoming the ‘new Mecca for transnational terrorism’ (Cragin et al. 2007, p.23).

Hence, the ASG primarily conducts training and operations on Mindanao island, the Zambonga Peninsula and the Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi-Tawi islands comprising the Sulu Archipelago (DOS 2012). ASG’s reach also extends to neighbouring Indonesia and Malaysia, where the group kidnaps tourists and sailors for ransom (Cabinet Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia [SETKAB] 2016; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security [PJCIS] 2011).

Several aspects of the ASG’s history is relevant to the assessment of its threat. The ASG’s ideological inclination is highly shaped by Janjalani’s observations of Muslims in the Philippines (Banlaoi 2006, p. 250). He particularly focused on the historical struggle of the Muslim Moro population that is native to the southern island of Mindanao (Katagiri 2019, p.523). Their history is marked by the marginalization from land ownership and continued economic exclusion, which were precipitated by government-initiated migration programs to Mindanao from the 1950s (Banlaoi 2006, p.251; Fabe 2013, p.232). The government’s failure in addressing the tensions between the Muslim Moro population and the Filipino Christian newcomers, persistent systemic discrimination, and the prevailing hostile attitudes towards one another has led to a narrative of religious struggle (Katagiri 2019, p.254).

The ASG’s secessionist nature is also tied to its formative years, where Janjalani declared that the formation of an Islamic state in Southern Philippines through jihad is the ‘surest guarantee of justice and prosperity for Muslims’ (Banlaoi 2006, p. 250). This history of religious struggle is crucial to the threat assessment of the ASG because Hashim Salamat, the leader of a Moro-led militant group, argued that Abu Sayyaf will persist so long as the historical struggle of the Moro people continues (Banlaoi 2006, p.250).

ASG’s history of combat violence is also crucial for the assessment of its threat because its combat incursions have led the Philippines’ National Security Adviser to name the ASG as the ‘most dangerous’ of all rebel groups in the country (B.Singh & J.Singh 2019, p.403). The violent siege of Marawi City between May and October 2017 is a significant point of ASG’s history. The siege was an attempt by a coalition of Moro militant groups led by the ASG to establish a wilayat or regional province for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Ramakrishna 2018, p.112). The Marawi siege is one of ASG’s most violent operations, leading to the deaths of over 1000 people (B. Singh & J. Singh 2019, p. 400). Moreover, security analyst Greg Fealy also claimed that ‘the battle for Marawi is the most significant terrorist event in Southeast Asia’ in over a decade since the 2002 Bali bombings (Morallo 2017).

Marawi Siege

The ASG’s objectives are also relevant to its threat assessment. Firstly, ASG aims to fulfill its ideological objective of establishing an independent Islamic state in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago in response to the historical and religious struggle of the Filipino Muslim minority (O’Brien 2012, p.323). Material goals also motivate the organisation. The ASG readily engages in lucrative criminal activities such as kidnappings and extortions of businessmen and foreigners for ransom, piracy, and working as ‘thugs for hire’ (Banlaoi 2010, p. 19). Consequently, the ASG is known as an ‘entrepreneur of violence’ as many of its commanders double as known bandits in their local communities, while its newer and younger recruits are more interested in pursuing monetary gains over ideological gains (Banlaoi 2010, p.19). Between 1992 and 2008, the ASG is said to have raised over US$ 35 million from kidnapping activities alone (O’Brien 2012, p.321)

However, these material gains are still underpinned by ASG’s ideological objective. The funds accrued from these criminal activities are still primarily used to advance their continued quest of attaining an Islamic state (Department of Home Affairs [DOHA] 2016). Moreover, Isnon Hapilon, one of ASG’s key leaders of the last decade, have emphasised the importance of ideology over criminality (B. Singh & J.Singh 2019, p. 404).

Organisational Structure

The ASG has undergone several changes in organisational and leadership structures. When it was first established, Janjalani had initially envisioned Abu Sayyaf as a ‘highly organised, systematic and disciplined organisation of fanatical secessionist Islamic fighters in Southern Philippines’ (Ugarte 2008a p.126). Thus, between 1991 and 1997, the group operated under the leadership of Janjalani as the primary amir (commander) with the support of a body called the Islamic Executive Council (IEC) (Banlaoi 2010, p. 17). This Council was comprised of 15 amirs tasked with supervising two units; the Jamiatul al-Islamic Revolutionary Tabligh Group (responsible for fundraising and Islamic education) and the al-Misuaratt Khutbah Committee (runs the agitation and propaganda operations) (Banlaoi 2006, p.252). Moreover, an armed unit was formed called Mujahidin al-Sharifullah, tasked with recruiting defectors from similar Moro militant groups for their technical and propaganda expertise (Katagiri 2019, p. 525).

Therefore, ASG’s organisational structure during its first decade reflected a hierarchical structure in its internal organisation where Janjalani is positioned as an authoritative figure with the support of the 15 amirs. This central leadership, which forms the IEC, was tasked with overseeing the units that each had their own defined responsibilities.

Chart

Above is a visualization of ASG’s organisational structure between 1991 and 1997 (Banlaoi 2006, p. 252; Katagiri 2019, p.525).

This type of structure offers strengths and weaknesses for the ASG. A more hierarchical structure encourages more unity, cohesion, and collective-action capacity (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones 2008, p. 34). Therefore, Janjalani was able to directly make sure that the IEC and its committees did not steer from their religious and secessionist goals while also maintaining group unity (Banlaoi 2006, p. 252). Moreover, the strengthened collective-action capacity resulting from a centralised structure offered mechanisms for quality control and centralised training and coordination, all of which contributed to ASG’s low level of incidents and casualties during this period (Katagiri 2019, p. 527). However, this structure creates security threats because the accumulation of command, tactical, and ideological resources in the hub or centre makes the central leadership a target for counter-terrorism efforts vis-à-vis decapitation (Katagiri 2019, p. 537). As key assets of ASG were not scattered around the group, when Janjalani was killed by the Philippines security forces in 1998, ASG descended into ideological and organisational disarray (Ramakrishna 2018, p. 115)

In July 1999, Janjalani’s younger brother, Khaddafy Janjalani, was appointed as the new amir of the ASG (Ramakrishna 2018, p. 115). However, Khaddafy lacked the leadership qualities and ideological fervour of his older brother to reunite the different factions that had emerged within the ASG (Banlaoi 2006, p. 252). Hence, between 1999 and Khaddafy’s death in January 2007, ASG resembled a disorganized network of armed groups led by their respective amirs, where they independently engaged in lucrative criminal and terrorist activities such as piracy, kidnapping-for-ransom, and general banditry in their territories in Sulu, Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi respectively (Ramakrishna 2018, p. 115). Even within each faction, they were further broken down to dozens of armed groups that acted independently while still profiteering off of ASG’s name (Banlaoi 2006, p. 252).

Figure

Consider the multi-modal network above which depicts the ASG’s involvement in kidnappings during this period up to 2011 (Gerdes et al. 2014, p. 279).

Small-scale kidnappings that were loosely organized and enacted both in the core and periphery of the ASG network was common practice (Gerdes et al. 2014, p. 269). In a study of the ASG’s involvement in the 2000 kidnapping of tourists in Sipadan island, scholars argued that the ASG did not operate as a cohesive group because of widespread distrust and competition (Ugarte 2008b, p. 306). ASG leaders must conduct ransom negotiations covertly to avoid other factions from recapturing their hostages and extorting another ransom (Gerdes et al. 2014, p.270). The increase in kidnappings was also ‘a sign of ASG weakness and diminution of its ideological focus’ (Chalk 2009, p. 1). When Isnilon Hapilon assumed ASG’s leadership in the 2010s, he ‘let loose ASG activities’ and was responsible for further eroding ASG’s leadership structure and encouraging (Katagiri 2019, p. 530). Hence, the ASG was a loose membership of competing militant groups (Gerdes et al. 2014, p.270).

Therefore, Janjalani’s death marks ASG’s shift towards a networked and decentralised structure. Networks increase collaboration opportunities because of its flexible and horizontal structure (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008, p.8). Hence, the ASG could easily attach itself with the Moro secessionist movement and earn their strategic military support during the 2017 Marawi City siege (Ramakrishna 2018, p.115). Additionally, decentralisation makes strategic targeting against networks more difficult (McAllister 2004, p.307). Consequently, the decapitation of ASG leaders has failed to ‘meaningfully reduce the loose network’s capabilities’ (Gerdes et al. 2014, p.287).

However, ASG’s networked structure also creates challenges. A wider network can trigger more conflict and disagreement over goals and strategy (Kahler 2015, p.115). Because of decentralisation, the ASG had fragmented into at least 18 separate cells with differing strategies when carrying out attacks, which led to more incidents (Katagiri 2019, p. 530). Decentralisation and the increased autonomy of cells have also led to disagreements over which objective should take precedence. While Hapilon and several commanders have focused on waging jihad, they were outnumbered by other factions more interested in material pursuits (Banlaoi 2010, p. 19).

Thus, the ASG tends to oscillate between ‘bandit group’ and ‘terrorist group’ depending on which factions are in power (Banlaoi 2010, p.19). Poor group cohesion and factionalism also drastically reduced the ASG’s strength by 30% from its peak of 1,296 fighters in 2002 to 350 by 2005 (Katagiri 2019, p. 529). Lastly, networked structures often lack organisational memory and institutional means to disseminate and store knowledge (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones 2008, p.32). With the recruitment of inexperienced fighters, it was up to the more experienced members to disseminate their tacit knowledge on staging kidnappings (Gerdes et al. 2014, p. 286). However, because the ASG lacks a working system to disseminate practical knowledge, important skills, and practical know-how are less likely to be maintained over time (Gerdes et al. 2014, p. 286).

Threat Assessment

The ASG poses several threats. Firstly, they threaten human security by targeting Filipino Christians and those it perceives to be rich Christian financiers (Katagiri 2019, p.527). Persaud (2015) defines threats to human security as threats towards human life or the quality of life of particular communities or vulnerable groups. As part of the ASG’s campaign to alleviate the Moro people’s grievance on having their ‘ancestral domain’ infringed, the group aims to expel the Christian settlers in Mindanao (South & Joll 2016, p. 172). Kidnappings are also disproportionately targeted towards people of this particular faith such as Christian clergy members, Christian missionaries, and non-Muslim foreigners (Gerdes et al. 2014, p.269; Katagiri 2019, p.530).

The ASG also threatens economic security. According to Shiffman (2015), threats to economic security involves the hampering one’s ability to create wealth and by causing economic damage. By specifically targeting Christian farmers and business owners through kidnappings and physical damage, normal economic activities are hampered, and economic damages are incurred (Gerdes et al. 2014, p. 269). The ASG’s tendency to target businesses (shopping centres, department stores, restaurants, commercial ferries) bombing has also led to tremendous economic damages. For the shipping company of the 2004 Superferry bombing, they incurred losses in tangible assets worth 70 million pesos while the 234 shipping crew members both lost their livelihoods and also incurred an opportunity cost of approximately five million pesos a month (Fabe 2013, p. 241). Similarly, the 2005 Valentine’s Day Bombing caused affected businesses to incur two million pesos in property damages (Fabe 2013, p. 242).

In addition, the ASG poses a threat to the national security of the Philippines. National security is under threat if state sovereignty (vis-à-vis legitimacy and control) is compromised (Makinda 2001, p. 401). The ASG’s objective to establish an independent Islamic state in the Southern Philippines directly threatens the territorial sovereignty of the Philippines (Welch 2013, p. 51). Importantly, ASG’s five-month siege and takeover of Marawi City came close to establishing a separate province for ISIS (Ramakrishna 2018, p. 112). Moreover, ASG’s continued presence and control of territories in the Southern Philippines undermines the government’s continuous efforts to extend their reach and integrate the peripheral Mindanao (Katagiri 2019, p. 524). Ugarte (2008b, p. 320) argued that the state’s failure to hold executive control over the means of violence in Southern Philippines signifies the erosion of state sovereignty in ASG-controlled regions. Basilan, one of ASG’s key bases of operation, resembles a ‘combat zone’ where the government’s reach appears to be fleeting (Ugarte 2008b, p. 315).

In the absence of a centralised leadership structure, the ASG operates as a loose networked structure of militant groups scattered around Southern Philippines (Gerdes et al. 2014, p.270). Because these militant groups compete for resources, they independently engage in banditry, kidnapping-for-ransom, and piracy to prevent other factions from capturing the ransoms for themselves (Gerdes et al. 2014, p.270). Hence, the ASG operates independently and covertly in small-scale criminal activities. However, the ASG tends to form coalitions and operate as a single unit during large-scale and high-profile plots such as the 2004 and 2005 bombings (Fabe 2013, p. 239).

Additionally, the ASG’s ability to recruit disaffected youth by promising material gains contributes to the group’s resilience as these younger recruits make up 79% of ASG’s membership (Banlaoi 2010, p.19). Moreover, the ASG garners support for its criminal and terrorist endeavours by pandering to particular movements. For example, the ASG refashioned itself as Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah (the Islamic Movement) to align itself with the global extremist movement and affiliate elements from several countries such as Afghanistan (Hizb-Islami), Egypt (Al Gamaa-Al-Islamiya), and Libya (International Harakatul Al-Islamia) (B.Singh & J. Singh 2019, p. 405). Similarly, ASG’s ability to link its Marawi Siege with the global ISIS movement helped the group receive military support from foreign fighters aligned with the Maute Group and ISIS (B. Singh & J. Singh 2019, p. 408).

Furthermore, ASG’s networked structure influences the type and effectiveness of their threats. This structure is beneficial in large-scale operations but impedes the effectiveness of small-scale operations. As a network, the ASG can stage ‘swarm attacks’ or coordinated, multi-pronged attacks where mobile groups simultaneously descend on the target (Moore 2012, p. 22). The relative success of the Marawi Siege and ASG ‘s ability to hold out for five months relates to the ability of its fighters to ‘divert and split the deployment of Philippine security forces in various parts of Mindanao’ (B.Singh & J.Singh 2019, p. 408). This swarming tactic allowed the remaining fighters to circumvent the heavy security of Marawi City and occupy the urban center for nearly 150 days (B.Singh & J.Singh 2019, p. 408).

However, organisational cohesion can also become eroded as networks continually decentralize and multiply (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones 2008, p.34). Because the ASG now lacks a centralised leadership to continuously instill collective values and maintain unity, members began acting on their individualistic motives and encouraged factionalism (Katagiri 2019, p. 529). When an ASG group began receiving ransoms for a kidnapping it independently staged, end-fighting ensued to the point where another ASG group attempted to rob the ransom money (Ugarte 2008b, p. 306). Thus, when it came to small-scale operations such as kidnappings, the networked structure of ASG increases competition and may jeopardise the operation.

Implications

Several steps have been taken to mitigate the threats perpetrated by the ASG. The government of the Philippines and its agencies have undertaken capacity-building measures to support its efforts against the ASG. These measures include a joint effort between the AFP and the U.S. through the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) to improve the Philippines’ counter-terrorism measures (Chalk 2009, p. 2). An analysis of AFP’s responses shows that they rely heavily on offensive capacity-building, which ‘makes little sense’ when responding to the ASG’s tactical operations (Chalk 2009, p.2). This incompatibility is seen during the 2017 Marawi Siege, where ASG’s networked structure enabled the group to circumvent the AFP’s conventional offensive strategy using a ‘divert and split’ tactic (B.Singh & J.Singh 2019, p. 408).

Steps have also been taken to hamper ASG’s ability to survive and engage in its activities. As discussed before, the ASG derives its resilience from the continued support of the disaffected Moro population in perpetuating their justification of a religious struggle and as a readily accessible source of young recruits (Banlaoi 2010, p.19). In response, the AFP has focused on persuading the local Muslim population in terrorist ‘hot spots’ to cooperate with authorities and complement the surveillance capacity of the AFP (Chalk 2009, p. 2). However, ASG’s decentralised structure continues to hamper the AFP’s intelligence gathering and infiltration efforts (ed. Inkster 2020, p. 110). Through the ASG’s insular and secretive structure combined with a network that relies on clan affiliation, family lines, and intermarriage, the ASG is ‘highly resistant to infiltration’ (ed. Inkster 2020, p.110).