There are key challenges confronting ASEAN’s ability to resolve the South China Sea dispute--some originate from within the organisation.
An Overview: The Geopolitical Nature of Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia is well known for being a maritime region to the point where the region’s maritime character is described as the ‘first and primary unifying factor of Southeast Asia’ (Chia 2005, p.27). The region’s distinct geography is further highlighted by the particular characteristics of the region’s states as nine out of the ten Southeast Asian states are either archipelagic or coastal states with the Philippines and Indonesia ranked as the world’s largest archipelagic states (Chia and MacAndrews 1981).
Consequently, the region’s vast seas are an important avenue to the interests of the Southeast Asian states. The South China Sea is such an example as the sea is contested by China, Taiwan, and several Southeast Asian states such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and, Brunei. Central to this territorial dispute is the role of the region’s international organisation called the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (henceforth, ASEAN) in navigating the issue.
Hence, this essay aims to assess the efficacy of ASEAN’s regional diplomacy by identifying and analysing the key challenges confronting the organisation’s ability to resolve regional security tensions, specifically the South China Sea territorial dispute. Crucial to the assessment of ASEAN is its decision-making process. Enshrined in the (Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] 2007) Charter, decisions must be achieved through consensus (mufakat) and unanimity (Majumdar 2015, p.80).
In this regard, this essay argues that ASEAN and the aforementioned mechanism of resolving issues face internal (intra-ASEAN disunity) and external (rising China) challenges, which impedes the organisation’s ability to resolve the South China Sea territorial dispute. First, consensus-decision making and in essence, the very core norm of ASEAN, is challenged by the difficulty in achieving a common position on the territorial dispute due to the internal disunity amongst the ASEAN states. Consensus is also difficult to achieve when there is an external challenge towards ASEAN in the form of an increasingly assertive China that is backed by economic and military strength and has thus, exerted a strong influence over the region. This external factor has caused power asymmetry in the region and deepens divisions amongst the ASEAN members, which further impacts the organisation’s ability to resolve the dispute.
ASEAN: (Dis)unity in Diversity
ASEAN has always focused on the creation of an integrated ‘ASEAN Community’ founded upon cooperation in political-security, economic, and socio-cultural avenues. In an effort that spanned half a century, (ASEAN 2015) finally launched a framework for such a community in 2015. This call for a community and extensive cooperation through the development of a single market echoes the sentiments of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (ASEAN 1976), which has become a key founding document for the organisation.
However, despite these efforts to foster a sense of community and integration, this essay argues that there is, in fact, a lack of internal cohesion within ASEAN. The organisation is made up of member states with disparate regime types because by 2015, ASEAN comprised of two communist regimes (Laos, Vietnam), two military juntas (Myanmar, Thailand), an absolute monarch (Brunei), an electoral autocracy (Cambodia), three semi-democratic regimes (Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines) and a consolidating democracy (Indonesia) (Jones and Jenne 2015, p. 211). By expanding the membership of the organisation, Jones and Jenne (2015, p.211) argue that this process of integration has weakened the coherence of ASEAN by creating disunity in regime types.
As such, ASEAN is far from being a homogeneous and encompassing region, best demonstrated by the different political institutions involved within the organisation (Kipgen 2018, p.434). The difference in political institutions means that ASEAN as an organisation must be able to express the interests of ten distinct sovereign actors (Ba 2016, p. 48).
Moreover, this disparate regime type challenges ASEAN’s ability to adopt a collective position by way of its traditional consensus decision-making process because there are inherent differences within each member state. As such, disunity challenges the organisations efforts to implement possible ad hoc arrangements to address the South China Sea dispute (Kigpen 2018, p. 440).
Importantly, fragmentation emerges even among the ASEAN claimant states. Among the four claimant states, the Philippines and Vietnam have been the most assertive and vocal in their response against strong Chinese actions in the South China Sea as they view Chinese actions in the region as a direct security concern (Majumdar 2015, p. 77). These actions include the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995, which directly confronted the Philippines’ Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) (Jones and Jenne 2015, p. 227). In 2012, a standoff between Chinese vessels and the Philippines in the coral reef of Scarborough Shoal located roughly 116 nautical miles from the Philippines’ island of Luzon has resulted in the continued Chinese de facto control of the waters around the reef (Zhang 2017, p. 443).
For the case of Vietnam, China has engaged in several naval conflicts. In 1974, a naval battle between South Vietnamese forces and China resulted in the full Chinese control over the disputed Paracel Islands (Guan 1999, p.1). A clash between Vietnam and China was repeated in 1988 as the Chinese navy invaded six reefs in the also contested Spratly Islands (Guan 1999, p.2). More recently, 2014 saw the Chinese deployment of a deepwater drilling rig in the contested waters around the Paracel Islands (Zhang 2017, p.444). Vietnam saw this as a direct encroachment of its EEZ and thus, triggered violent confrontations between Chinese and Vietnamese law enforcement vessels at sea and sweeping anti-China protests which escalated into full-blown riots that came to a stop when China finally removed the rig after two months (International Crisis Group 2015, p.4).
Meanwhile, Malaysia and Brunei are both ‘playing safe’ by using softer approaches while balancing a preference towards American presence with appeasing policies towards China (Gamas 2014, p. 34).
Furthermore, other member states also espouse divergent regional responses. Officially not a claimant state, Indonesia’s policy towards the South China Sea has been that of maintaining a ‘delicate equilibrium’ of cautious but friendly relations between Washington and Beijing (Parameswaran 2016, p. 322). This is because, as one of the key founders of the NonAligned Movement and the biggest ASEAN member state, Indonesia is compelled to play the role of ‘honest broker’ (International Crisis Group 2015, p.5)
On the other hand, a survey conducted among Thailand’s military officials shows that the military junta is supportive of continued American presence in the region as a balance against China, which aligns with the longstanding Thai-U.S. military alliance (Blaxland and Raymond 2017, p. 15).
Also supportive of American balancing is Singapore. Both countries share a strong belief in ensuring the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. This is particularly important for the survival of Singapore’s economy as the island state’s status as an international shipment and aviation hub depends on the openness of the region’s sea and air lanes (Chan 2016, p.43).
Furthermore, different policy prescriptions on the South China Sea are also based on the ASEAN member states’ relations with China. This is where China, as an external player, challenges ASEAN efforts to consolidate their position on the South China Sea.
Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia are an exceptional case to the South China Sea dispute because they do not have any direct stake in the dispute and are also recipients of a large amount of Chinese investment (Bolesta 2018, p. 24; Cambodia Investment Board [CIB] 2016;). It is no surprise that Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar prefer to abstain from offering any independent positions on the sea dispute for fear of jeopardising their economic interest with China (Majumdar 2015, p.77). This case of patron-client relationship is most severe in the case of Cambodia, particularly during the country’s 2012 ASEAN chairmanship and ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM).
Cambodia and Intra-ASEAN rift
In the 45th AMM, the events of the Scarborough Shoal standoff were understandably brought up by the Philippines and Vietnam. However, an intra-ASEAN rift was apparent in the AMM because, for the first time in ASEAN history, the ASEAN members could not agree on a joint communiqué. This is because Cambodian foreign minister Hor Namhong insistently blocked any draft document that mentioned the Scarborough Shoal or issues of China’s infringement of Vietnam’s EEZ, to the dismay of the Philippines and Vietnam (Thayer 2013, p.78). Hor Namhong believed that the aforementioned issues are bilateral in nature and should thus, be resolved bilaterally. This echoes China’s preference of bilateral negotiations over multilateral negotiations, with many seeing this strategy as a way to effectively block ASEAN consensus over the South China Sea dispute (Baviera 2014, p.95).
Furthermore, Gamas (2014, p.38) argues that bilateralism allows China to utilise its economic and military strength to influence individual claimant states. Hence, Chinese interests had been protected by Cambodia’s ASEAN chairmanship, such that one diplomat attending the summit described that China had ‘bought the chair’ (Perlez 2012).
As such, China was able to shape ASEAN policy in accordance with its interests under Cambodia’s ASEAN chairmanship (Gamas 2014, p. 45). The case above demonstrates the inability to devise a unified ASEAN approach, which has great implications on the conflict management of the South China Sea because ASEAN decision-making necessitates consensus in all its decisions (Majumdar 2015, p. 80).
South China Sea tensions left host Cambodia with no joint statement to read
Conclusion: Disunity impacts ASEAN decision-making
ASEAN has found difficulties in formulating an effective Code of Conduct (CoC) for the South China Sea because of disagreements in the geographic scope of the South China Sea, restrictions on reclamation constructions, military activities in the waters surrounding Spratly Islands, and the policies regarding the detainment of fisherman found to infringe on disputed waters (Thayer 2013, p.76-7). These differences are crucial because a CoC that would possibly resolve the South China Sea dispute cannot be formulated without a consensus among ASEAN state members. As this paper has identified and analysed, ASEAN’s ability to resolve the territorial dispute has been challenged by intra-ASEAN disunity brought by different and competing regimes, factionalism, and external influences exerted by a rising China. Hence, ASEAN must first adopt a unified position on the issue of the South China Sea that involves resolving both internal ASEAN disunity and external relations with China.
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